Posts Tagged 'Keith Park'

A Short Critique of Vincent Orange

[Cross posted from Thoughts on Military History]

One of the key authors I have to engage with in my PhD is Dr Vincent Orange. What follows is a short critic of his work as it appears in the introduction to my thesis. It may seem that I am being harsh but I feel that are some important structural and historiographical issues with his works. They tend to lean towards the hagiographical and need to be read with care and with an understanding of the context of both the period and of the RAF.

Orange has written several key biographies of RAF airmen. In general, these works have been well received and undeniably, Orange has added valuable accounts to the historiography of the RAF. As Air Commodore (ret’d) Henry Probert, the former head of the RAF’s Air Historical Branch, noted in his review of Orange’s work on Air Marshal Sir Arthur ‘Mary’ Coningham in 1990 there had been few biographies of RAF commanders.[1] Thus, this work was a welcome addition to the field. This is a situation that to a large degree still exists to this day, though Orange himself has added several important works since writing his Coningham biography; however, it should be noted that works dealing with combat pilots rather than high commanders of the RAF remain an ever-popular genre with the publishing houses.

However, while Orange’s works have been lauded an important issue must be considered when utilising these works. This is the issue of bias that is inherent in all of his works, but notably his biographies of Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park and Air Chief Marshal Baron Dowding. The issue can be described as the ‘Park View of History, in effect his works are biased to the view of Park when viewing contentious events; it should be noted that Orange’s first biography was his work on Park and his affinity to this important airmen is noticeable in his writings. This especially notable in sections of his works that deal with the Battle of Britain but this bias is also inferred in sections of dealing with the issues surrounding the use of air power in the Normandy Campaign. Even in his work on Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor, a book that is generally positive about this airmen’s contribution to air power history, we can see this bias emerge where the subject turns to events that include Park or officers involved in the contentious events of 1940. For example, in discussing, the decision to replace Slessor with Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Douglas of Kirtleside at Coastal Command at the start of 1944 Orange describes the RAF’s posting system as random and that it was the wrong decision for the forthcoming role that the command would play in preparations for OVERLORD.[2] However, Orange’s criticism is wrong, as it was not unusual to post officers to new commands in order for them to gain further operational experience. In addition, the change in command for Slessor, and indeed Douglas, did not significantly affect the conduct of the war. In reality, the decision to send Slessor to the Mediterranean aided in the conduct of complex political issues that affected operations in theatre; Slessor undoubtedly had the skills need for dealing with the political of coalition operations.[3] In addition, Douglas fitted in with the command team then being gathered together for OVERLORD through his experience of working with these officers in the Mediterranean in 1942 and 1943. In addition, to argue that he had a lack of experience is to ignore his time as Deputy Chief of the Air Staff where he would have been fully cognizant with the problems facing Coastal Command.[4]

Perhaps Orange’s bias, in particular towards those officers involved in the debates of 1940, can be best summed up by comments made in his review of John Ray’s work The Battle of Britain, New Perspectives: Behind the Scenes of the Great Air War in the Journal of Military History.[5] In this review, Orange concludes by noting that ‘Dowding and Park were right, Douglas and Leigh-Mallory were wrong.’[6] This simplistic analysis of the debates of fighter tactics in 1940 and 1941 highlights the partisan nature of Orange’s work. He sees himself as the defender of Park’s, and latterly Dowding’s reputation. In doing so, he has sought to denigrate the role and impact of their contemporaries. In doing this, he ignores the difficulties of fighter operations as a whole but rather concentrates on daylight defensive operations.

[1] Henry Probert, ‘Coningham by Vincent Orange (Book Review)’ Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, Vol. 135, No. 2 (Summer: 1990) p. 81

[2] Orange, Slessor, p. 123

[3] For a more positive view of Slessor’s impact both at Coastal Command and the Meditteranean Allied Air Forces see; Corvin Connelly, ‘Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Cottesworth Slessor and the Anglo-American Air Power Alliance, 1940-1945’ PhD Thesis (Texas A&M University, 2001) pp. 193-271

[4] Lord Douglas of Kirtleside with Robert Wright, Years of Command: The Second Volume of the Autobiography of Sholto Douglas, Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, GCB, MC, DFC (London; Collins, 1966) p. 246

[5] Vincent Orange, ‘The Battle of Britain, New Perspectives: Behind the Scenes of the Great Air War by John Ray (Book Review)’ Journal of Military History, Vol. 59, No. 2 (1995:Apr.) pp.348-349

[6] Orange, ‘The Battle of Britain (Review)’ p. 349

Patronage and Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory

[Cross posted at Thoughts on Military History]

In trying to understand leadership competence and why people end up in the positions that they do there is one factor that cannot be underplayed, and that is the role of patronage. Patronage as a concept usually conjures up images of people with powerful patrons pushing them into positions of power and influence, and on occasion into positions that these people are not capable of fulfilling. Patronage works well in the military sphere as powerful senior officers take a keen interest in the careers of up and coming officers who they feel they need to nurture in order to further their careers and in some cases ensure the services priorities. Nowhere is this truer than in the early RAF. Lord Trenchard took a keen interest in the careers of several officers who he felt would eventual form the core of the services high command in later years. Names such a Sir John Slessor and Viscount Portal of Hungerford are men whose careers prospered because of his support. However, this does not automatically mean that they would not have reached high command without his support but perhaps it made it easier. However, Trenchard must have seen competence in their abilities in order to offer that support. Indeed with Slessor it was certainly the case that his keen intellect appears to have been the reason for that early support, though he did not always agree with Trenchard.

But what of Leigh-Mallory? Does patronage answer the central question of why he reached such a high rank? Unfortunately I do not think this is the case. Yes he was friends with future key players in the RAF but they were in no position in the 1920s to sponsor his move up the command chain. What of Trenchard? Leigh-Mallory was certainly known by him. For example, Slessor in The Central Blue remarks about how Trenchard would mix up their names when they worked in the Air Ministry in 1922.[1] However, one way of marking those who Trenchard marked out for future promotion can be seen by those who attended the first course of the newly established RAF Staff College at Andover. On this course were men such as Slessor, Portal, Lord Douglas of Kirtleside and Sir Keith Park. The key issue here is that unlike later courses the students of the first course were handpicked by Trenchard to attend. Trenchard considered the Staff College as a ‘School of Thought’ for the nascent RAF; therefore, we can assume that these men were viewed by Trenchard as the core of RAF’s future. However, Leigh-Mallory would eventually attend Staff College in 1925 and in 1934 he attended the Imperial Defence College, which clearly marked him out for high command in the future. Another important name missing from first course is Lord Tedder, who in 1923 as sent by Trenchard to attend the Royal Naval Staff College at Greenwich.[2]

What of the Second World War? Did he receive positions because of his earlier friendships? For example, he was friends with Portal.[3] Did this mean that he received the commands he did because of this friendship? Again I am not convinced that there is enough evidence for this. Yes Portal was involved in the decision to appoint Leigh-Mallory as AOC-in-C of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force in 1943 but this had more to do with his view of the air offensive and how he initially perceived the nature of air support for the invasion. Similarly there is little archival evidence, certainly in the personal papers, that Douglas pushed for Leigh-Mallory. Indeed it can be argued that Douglas’ decision to replace Park had more to do with an unfortunate incident at an air tournament at Hendon in 1920 than anything else. Neither Park nor Douglas was to see eye to eye after this event.[4] Unfortunately the whole debate over Douglas’ assumption of command at Fighter Command has become far too polarised for it to be difficult to separate the issues at play but it must not forgotten that there were valid reasons to remove Dowding.

The one person who may have patronised Leigh-Mallory during the war was Earl Mountbatten of Burma.[5] Both had worked closely together during the planning for RUTTER/JUBILEE and it is obvious in the correspondence after the operation that their offensively minded outlooks found in each other a like-minded individual. Mountbatten was seeking to continue his plan for ever larger Combined Operations and Leigh-Mallory wanted to continue his fighter offensive against the Luftwaffe. This relationship would come into play when Leigh-Mallory left the AEAF in 1944 and was due to go out to SEAC to command the air forces in theatre. Mountbatten noted in his diary:

15 August 1944…Lunched with Leigh-Mallory…, and had an important discussion with him.[6]

On the same day Leigh-Mallory on returning from this meeting recorded in his diary that:

…he now regarded the campaign in France and Western Europe…as won and his eyes were turning in the direction of the Far East whither he was shortly to proceed.[7]

Mountbatten would later record on hearing of Leigh-Mallory’s plane crash that:

15 November 1944…This is an absolute body blow, for, having at last succeeded in collecting a team of really young and dashing Commanders-in-Chief whom I know and like and can work well with, it is disheartening to lose one of the team before he has even taken over.[8]

There certainly existed a positive relationship between these two senior commander and their offensive views worked together. Is there an element of patronage, yes, but how important is it is an important question that needs to be examined further. I do not doubt that at various time during his career Leigh-Mallory had important friends and acquaintances but did they further his career? Perhaps Mountbatten may have in 1944 as there was probably little chance of him going back to Fighter Command after AEAF but had this happened would he have found a position in the Air Ministry? These are question that need to be further examined.

However, the key question that exists is if patronage not a valid reason for his promotion to high command then what is the answer? Is it that he is capable and competent commander? Perhaps an answer the popular cultural memory of events such as the Battle of Britain and D-Day cannot accept?

[1] John Slessor, The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections (London: Cassell, 1956) p. 46

[2] Vincent Orange, Tedder: Quietly in Command (London: Frank Cass, 2004) p. 70

[3] It is interesting to note that Denis Richards in his biography of Portal does not mention Leigh-Mallory. Denis Richards, Portal of Hungerford: The Life of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Viscount Portal of Hungerford KG, GCB, OM, DSO, MC (London: Heinemann, 1977)

[4] Vincent Orange, Park: The Biography of Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park GCB, KBE, MC, DFC, DCL (London: Grub Street, 2001) pp. 43-44; Lord Douglas or Kirtleside with Robert Wright, Years of Command: The Second Volume of the Autobiography of Sholto Douglas (London: Collins, 1966) pp. 14-15

[5] The best and most recent biography of Mountbatten is, Adrian Smith, Mountbatten: Apprentice War Lord (London: I B Tauris, 2010)

[6] Philip Ziegler (Ed.) Personal Diary of Admiral the Lord Louis Mountbatten: Supreme Allied Commander South-East Asia, 1943-1946 (London: Collins, 1988) p. 124

[7] The National Archives (TNA), AIR 37/784, Daily Reflections on the Course of the Battle by Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, KCB, DSO, p. 105

[8] Ziegler (Ed.) Personal Diary, p. 154

Dowding and the ‘Big Wings’

[Cross-posted at Thoughts on Military History]

Well another good day at the archives, to be honest it was needed after the week I have had but that is another story. Today I was looking through the papers of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Baron Douglas of Kirtleside. There was some useful information in here, especially his correspondence with Robert Wright who served as his writer for his autobiography.

One piece of correspondence that particularly caught my eye was the following extract from Wright to Douglas regarding comments offered by Air Chief Marshal Dowding on his knowledge regarding the so-called animosity between Air Vice-Marshals’ Park and Leigh-Mallory, his chief operational commanders during the Battle of Britain. In a letter dated 28 March 1961 Wright writes the following:

There are two further important points for Chapter 13 of your book which Stuffy Dowding asks if you would consider. I mentioned these to you on the phone this morning.

The first is the “wings” controversy. Stuffy would like to be involved in this as little as possible. On page 13-19 of your script there is a note about it…Stuffy tells me that in actual fact he knew nothing about this until it had reached a fairly advanced stage, when, to his great surprise, the S. of S. mentioned to him the views advanced to him by Leigh-Mallory based on the idea put forward by Bader. Would you consider, for the present and until I am able to complete drafting this piece for your consideration, changing that note so that it reads:

“My personal interest in the controversy over the use that as made in the Battle of Britain of squadrons in wings; the Park school versus the Leigh-Mallory school of thought.”

What are we to make of this admission?

The way I see it there are two possible explanations here. First, if Dowding is accepted at face value then this is an amazing admission regarding his commanding competency. Yes he had devolved operational command to the groups but he still should have been aware of the relations between his commanders and he should have been doing something to deal with it’ the fact that he did not shows him to have failed in managing his commanders properly. The second possible explanation is a worse still. It is that he did know about it and failed to do something about it effectively and by the time of this correspondence he was aware that he had made a mistake and was trying to massage the record. Unfortunately there is no evidence to support this second assumption but considering Wright’s later polemic, Dowding and the Battle of Britain, one can wonder.

The unfortunate issue is that both theories are not palatable for the publics’ perception of Dowding especially this year, the 70th anniversary of the battle. Dowding is perceived to have single-handedly won the Battle of Britain, however, there are times when his must move away from hagiographic analyses and offer some hard truth regarding the public’s perception. This is the only way that we can effectively understand the past. My feelings are it is the former argument, which illustrates some of the failings that Dowding did have as a commander i.e. while he built up and effective system that defeated the Luftwaffe in 1940 he issues when dealing with people either above or below him, a necessary pre-requisite for effective command. Of course it can be argued that Leigh-Mallory had similar failing but that shall be dealt with at a future date. The ‘Big Wing’ controversy, and Leigh-Mallory’s role in it, is something that I shall have to deal with at some point in my thesis so information like this is very useful.

By Ross Mahoney

Views of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory

[Cross-posted at Thoughts on Military History]

I think our normal view of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory has very much been skewed by his portrayal in the popular media. The most famous portrayal comes in the 1969 Battle of Britain. arguably the best film on the subject, having been based on Wood and Dempster’s The Narrow Margin, however, it does not portray him in the best of lights and follows what I describe as the Park version of the battle.

Now I am not saying this to detract from Park’s important role but there is an important point here that due to his untimely death in November 1944 Leigh-Mallory was never able to defend his actions through the publication of a memoir, autobiography or authorised biography. Thus, we tend to get a skewed interpretation of his ability. One that is more hagiographical than accurate to the record.

However, I quite like this portrayal of Leigh-Mallory. It is very much the physical representation of of Fighter Commands role in 41/42 when the command was order to ‘reach into france.’ I found it in Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory’s papers at the RAF Museum this past Thursday. It shows Leigh-Mallory running a rapier through Reichsmarshall Hermann Goering. I think it is great euphemism for the battle between the RAF and the Luftwaffe. Also it shows Leigh-Mallory as the valiant fighter against the evil enemy, perhaps a link to the perhaps a link to the aces ideal of the ‘Knights of the Air’ in combat. It is noted dated but I suspect it is from late 1942 when Leigh-Mallory had taken over from Douglas as head of Fighter Command. Also if anyone knows who the artist is let me know. There is an artist’s mark in the corner.

By Ross Mahoney


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